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Abstract
The Consequences of Annexation on Financial Markets
By
Kristina Khederlarian
Claremont Graduate University: 2020

The objective of this study will be to understand the consequences of annexation
through a lens that is political and financial. The scope of research will include the three
prominent cases of annexation by major powers over the past twenty years. This lends
itself to three case studies: Crimea, Kashmir and Hong Kong. We will be selecting these
three cases, since those were three that involved annexation by a major power over the
past twenty years. Although our study is reserved to those three cases, we will briefly
review historic cases of annexation in the literature review section because it will help
us form a framework for our hypotheses. The first aim will be to develop a political
analysis of each event, arriving at a developed scenario analysis that identifies actions
taken by governments to harmonize territorial integrity. The second aim is to identify the
consequences of annexation from a financial pers. This section will focus on GDP per
capita, investment and the real estate market. Results of this study suggest that
financial conditions within the contested area of Crimea, are an indicator of political
stability and successful annexation. In the cases of Kashmir and Hong Kong, we
tentatively expect to see similar results in future years post annexation. While prominent
literature on the subject of annexation has assumed that political pressure through

international relations has largely determined success of annexation efforts, this study
suggests that success in domestic satisfaction through economic conditions and market
stability prove to be primary factors in determining the likelihood of success for any
annexation effort. Regardless of external pressure from the international community,
successful annexation can be achieved. In this study we identify the level of political
dissent and the subsequent economic impact. The results of this research tentatively
indicate that as overall GDPPC rises, the contested area has support from local
constituencies for annexation by the major power. We have confirmed this in the case of
Crimea, and are pending confirmation in Kashmir and Hong Kong since the events
occurred in 2019. Another interesting contribution of this study is the impact of the real
estate and investment markets. We find that annexation by the major power results in
higher levels of property values and investment flourishes. The case study of Crimea
suggests that property values may initially drop as investors are unsure of the stability of
the annexation, but a year after the annexation is stable we see rates rapidly rising to a
point well above market value prior to the annexation. This of course suggests valuable
insights to international investors as well as identifies opportunities for future research in
this field. From a research perspective, this study provides a dataset for scholars to use
in future studies and a framework for looking at annexation holistically. From a policy
perspective, this study contributes by suggesting a tangible way for major powers to
gain success in annexation.
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Introduction
This research will pair international politics and financial markets together, to
identify conditions and effects of annexation over the last 20 years by major powers. We
will conduct a complete political as well as financial analysis, to better understand the
impact of annexation. The research will first employ a computational modeling
assessment to show that contested areas can produce varying degrees of success for
the annexation. This assessment will start by identifying all stakeholders, their stance,
and influence. It will allow us to identify the most likely scenarios and possible
consequences in each contested area.
After this initial political assessment is complete, we will move to a complete
financial analysis of the regions. This financial analysis will look at data in three regions
this study addresses: GDP per capita, investment and property values. These three
variables, will help us develop a comprehensive picture of the economy in each region.
We will examine the impact of each indicator at the point of annexation. For the
purposes of this study, annexation will be defined as the forceful incorporation of
territory previously autonomous.
As previously mentioned, we will be examining all instances where annexation
has occurred with a world power over the past two decades. The three cases involving
the annexation of a smaller state by major powers of the last 20 years, consists of:
Kashmir, Crimea and Hong Kong. These three cases illustrate a process of annexation
that is experienced continuously over time. We see that although there is a particular
date where we can say this annexation occurred, the impact ripples beyond the actual
event. In this research, we aim at considering the likelihood of successful annexation,
1

given certain government action and resulting macro-economic effects. Understanding
these actions, we will look at how each stakeholder is able to influence the outcome.
All of the cases involve an overwhelming powerful state confronts an extremely
weak annexee. We will want to see how this smaller state is changed by being
absorbed by this larger power, primarily in the economic and political sense. Our aim is
to conduct a comprehensive, multi-case study to identify the trends that lead to a
successful annexation, and to better understand how financial indicators help us to
determine the political stability in contested regions. Each of these cases will allow us to
see varying degrees of successful annexations. This will be an important contribution to
research in this field, because it will suggest that successful annexation follows a
repeatable pattern that can be applied across cases in the future.
As scholars have thought for some time, political and economic factors determine
success or failure. Successful annexation can therefore, also be thought of in terms of
politics and economics. We will use these two measures to determine the degree of
success or failure. The first goal is to identify the level of political dissent - internal and
international - immediately following annexation. We will accomplish this by examining
the consequences and actions of each event. We will seek to identify the economic
consequences that affect the annexee. In this study, we define “annexee” as the weaker
state that is absorbed by the major power.
The political analysis will be performed using an expected utility analysis that
detects the level of confrontation and cooperation immediately following a political
annexation. We will employ subject matter experts on each of the cases to generate the
data used for each case study. This data identifies all stakeholders and defines their
2

position on the question of annexation, their individual influence, their group affiliation’s
influence, and the salience of the issue to them. The subsequent data set for each crisis
will then be ran into a simulation, which will produce potential outcomes in each case.
To assess the impact of economic changes, we will proceed by examining
investment, property values and changes in overall Gross Domestic Product per Capita
(GDPPC). Data for each case will be collected, controlled for inflation and then used to
calculate a few different statistics, which will allow us to better understand the degree of
change in each measure.
We expect that overall investment and a positive GDPPC in the contested region
will increase support for annexation. Rise in property values will also support
annexation, but buying property in contested areas is risky, and continued resistance
may cause the real estate market to suffer.

3

Chapter 1
Background

4

1.1 Literature Review
Exploring historical cases of annexation in the international system, much of the
literature looks at individual cases of annexation rather than holistically approaching the
study to identify patterns and trends across cases. We hope that this study will
contribute to the field of annexation research by identifying trends that are continuous
across events. Although we may not have a complete picture of the impact of
annexation on weaker states, previous annexation does provide a window to success
and failure. In order to understand the impact of these events, we will turn our attention
to the historical account of the Panama and Suez canal: two failed cases of annexation,
and then the successful annexation of California and Hawaii by the United States.
When examining past cases of annexation the Panama Canal case is
illuminating. The contested region switched hands between Columbia, France and the
US, until it eventually Panama achieved autonomy. So for the purposes of this study, it
is quite important to examine this case since it does involve a few major powers. Being
the only practical connection between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the manmade
canal was a highly desirable prize to control. It was no wonder that this territory was
very sought after by those who controlled the international system, for control of this
territory meant economic prosperity for all concerned. After several disputes, the US
controlled the area for better part of 1900s. This control, led to the formation of a treaty
in the later have of the century. In 1977, the Torrijos–Carter Treaties joined the US and
Panama in a partnership of joint control of the region. Although this treaty brought hope
for a joint partnership, it did not last long. In 1999, the canal was ceded by the United

5

States allowing Panama full control of the state and canal in Panama. 1 This apparent
successful annexation derailed despite substantive economic gains for the Panamanian
population. The case of the Panama Canal is one of the two failed cases that we
analyze from a historic basis, which will give us a framework into the larger
phenomenon of why certain annexations by major powers fail while other succeed.
It appears that historic annexation, many times does exist when we see an
opportunity for financial gain. Another highly desirable waterway is the Suez Canal. This
canal is the backdrop for our next case of annexation. This canal serves as the
connection between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. Clearly, it was also a
very desirable piece of territory for major powers to want to incorporate. Although it is in
Egypt, the canal was controlled by the UK and France, until 1956 when following the
Suez war, control was taken by the Egyptian government through nationalization. 2 This
is another case of unsuccessful annexation driven in large part perhaps by international
anticolonial pressure by the United States, that as the dominant state during this period
had overtaken both Britain and France following World War II. It poses the question as
to whether international pressures can impact an annexation. Despite the contribution to
external powers, we do not think that international pressure actually plays much of an
influence, when the inhabitants of the contested region support the annexation.
Exploring two cases of unsuccessful annexation, help us in this study by suggesting that
annexation can be looked at holistically rather than on an individual basis. We seek to
understand the trends and patterns present in cases of success and cases of failure. By
McCullough, D. G. (2004). The Path between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914.
New York: Simon and Schuster.
2
Shupe, M. C., Wright, W. M., Hipel, K. W., & Fraser, N. M. (1980). Nationalization of the Suez Canal A
Hypergame Analysis. The Journal of Conflict Resolution (Pre-1986), 24(3), 477.
1
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identifying commonalities, we contribute by developing a theory that can be applied
across cases in the future.
In the first two cases, we explored failure. In the case of the Panama and Suez
canals, we see that these regions were monetarily self-supporting. They did not need
support from a major power to generate a rise in their economy, and subsequently we
see that the local population did not favor annexation by the major power. In contrast,
there are cases were weaker states do not have this sort of self-generating economic
value and annexation is more likely to be successful.
Turning our attention to the United States, we see that much of the country that
we know today as the US is actually a result of successful annexation. For instance, the
annexation of California, which was previously controlled by Mexico, following MexicanAmerican war in 1846 is a useful example. This region was previous controlled by the
Mexican government, but the US was able to cease the land. Two years later, the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed and put an end to the war. Through this war,
the US successfully added to their nation in a substantial manner. The US seized
control of New Mexico and California. This annexation did not end in just the addition of
these two regions. In addition, conflicts over the boundary of Texas were also resolved.
It did take some time for these contested areas to become official states, and as this
study has previously mentioned, annexation can be continuous and overtime. California
was completed integrated into the US, when it became an official state in 1850. The
resulting economic prosperity insured successful integration.
The United States provides us with additional cases to study for the purposes of
gaining insight into more successful annexation. The US annexation of Hawaii in 1899
7

followed a bloodless coup. This case study provides a good example of how annexation
can have economic consequences for the smaller state. An economic analysis of the
consequences by Burdekin and Laney, point out the sugar market’s growth post
annexation. Looking at this industry, we can see the economic impact of the absorption
into the US. In this case, we see that complete integration with the US, led Hawaiian
sugar companies and stockholders to experience significant gains. 3 This case brings
forth an interesting proposition that the annexation by a major power can significantly
impact the economy and increase stock market growth in the smaller economy. We will
use this premise to expand on the range of economic consequences of successful
annexation.
These studies set the framework that we will further explore in this paper. We
see two examples of unsuccessful annexation, where the local consituties did not
support the annexation and did not rely on the power for financial stability. In the case of
the Panama and Suez Canals, both were financially self-supporting and local
populations opposed the annexation. In the case of Hawaii and California, both states
benefited economically by incorporating into the US and did not oppose the annexation
locally. As previously stated, being a major power does not necessarily mean
annexation of a weaker state will be successful. We think that success or failure in
cases such as these depend on political as well as economic factors. When exploring
these factors, we will look at the stance of all stakeholders- internal and external to the
region. Our aim will be to explore the full consequences of these type of conflicts over

Burdekin, R., & Laney, L. (2008). Financial Market Reactions to the Overthrow and Annexation of the
Hawaiian Kingdom: Evidence from London, Honolulu and New York. Cliometrica, 2(2), 119–141.
3

8

control of contested regions. We will explain cases of annexation involving major
powers over the past 20 years hoping to identify patterns and trends that can be applied
to all cases of annexation in the future. By the end of this study, our hope will be that we
have identified trends that are consistent across cases and provides a framework for
looking at annexation in the future. We will initial provide the cases and framework that
will be able to be expanded on by scholars in the future.

9

Chapter 2
Hypothesis

10

2.1 Political Analysis
In this study, we carried out political assessments of the level of confrontation
between competing groups within the annexed region, and across to the international
system. The data generated in each of these cases is available for review and
duplication in the appendix of this volume. The method used for these analyses include
subject matter experts’ examinations of each case, which help us to identify all key
stakeholders involved. The complete list of all stakeholders can be examined by the
reader in the appendix. After identifying who plays an important role in each event, we
define their position on the annexation. This information was used to generate a scale
for analysis. Asking where each stakeholder stands on the issue, we form a scale
between 0 and 100. We place each player somewhere on that scale. Then we start
defining their influence, group affiliation and power in the conflict. These indicators allow
us to map out where each agent stands in respect to the annexation, and truly allows us
to see how their positions will influence the overall outcome of each event. We will
examine these positions on a visual chart that will allow the reader to see where each
stakeholder stands and how much influence they have over the outcome.
When examining each of these three cases, we see that the issue was always
the same. We find ourselves asking, do the competing actors support the contested
region’s independence, or do they favor annexation by the large state? Answers varied
in each of our examinations. The Crimean population supported Soviet annexation – but
this move was opposed by the West and tacitly agreed to by China. This will pose an
interesting question of whether or not external opposition really plays a part in the
success or failure of annexation. We expect it does not matter, but further analysis will

11

confirm or deny this hypothesis. In Kashmir, the majority Muslim population opposed
integration into India supporting autonomy or an integration into Pakistan. The
international community was mute. In this case we will see whether the internal
population can stop an event from happening. Hong Kong is a more complex as the
dispute is over the level of autonomy within China rather than independence. In this
case China has thus far acquiesced in large part to Hong Kong. Most recent events
show us that the one country, two systems model will be dissolved by 2020. Uses the
analysis of these three cases, we will develop a theory for future annexation. We posit
that annexation by great powers follows a very simple path:
1. Successful political annexation requires support of the local population.
International pressure is irrelevant.
2. Political annexation is contested and may fail without local population support. A
consequence of local population is seen in rising property rights and rising
investment. International support is marginally relevant for great power
annexation.

To test the above hypotheses we will apply an Excepted Utility Model that has been
successfully used to anticipate the short- and long-term outcome of complex negations
by scholars in the field of international politics by Kugler, Feng and Abdollahian in
studies that model the economic and political aspects of complex international

12

interactions.

4 5

This approach will use data generated by subject matter experts for

each of the contested regions. We will run an analysis concurrent with the annexation of
each region. As previously mentioned, data is obtained from established subject matter
experts who identifying five key indicators – the stakeholders in the contest, the relative
influence of each such stakeholder, the group to which they belong, the relative
influence of each group, the relative influence of stakeholders within each group, the
position stakeholders advocate on the selected issue and the importance they attach to
the outcome. This data will be used to identify outcomes, opportunities for negotiations
and bargaining with other stakeholders, and will ultimately help us to test each of the
above hypotheses. 6 7 In order for the reader to duplicate the results of this study, the
data generated for each case is available in the appendix of this volume.

Yi Feng, Jacek Kugler, Siddharth Swaminathan & Paul J. Zak (2008) Path to Prosperity: The Dynamics
of Freedom and Economic Development, International Interactions, 34:4, 423-441
5
Abdollahian, M., Yang, Z., Coan, T. et al. Human development dynamics: an agent based simulation of
macro social systems and individual heterogeneous evolutionary games. Complex Adapt Syst Model 1,
18 (2013).
6
Abdollahian M., Kugler J., Nicholson B., Oh H. (2010) Politics and Power. In: Kott A., Citrenbaum G.
(eds) Estimating Impact. Springer, Boston, MA
7
Takao Terano and Kenichi Naitoh. 2004. Agent-Based Modeling for Competing Firms: From BalancedScorecards to Multi-Objective Strategies. In Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS’04) - Track 3 - Volume 3 (HICSS ’04). IEEE
Computer Society, USA, 30090.
4
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2.2 Financial Analysis
Political and economic stability have are direct relationship with one another, and
previous research shows that political instability has a negative effect on private
investment. 8 The second half of this study will be a complete financial analysis of each
of the cases in question. By analyzing, key economic indicators, we believe that we will
be able to establish a framework for thinking about annexation from a financial sense.
Failure and success will be thought of in terms wider than politics alone. We posit that
stability in the annexed region is achieved by sustained economic success. The
universal macroeconomic indicator of GDPPC will need to be evaluated in order to
monitor the general financial condition of the region. 9 Trends in investment indicate
overall economic performance and can be measured through property values and
federal direct investment or capital fixed investment in the contested area.

10 11 12

By

examining property values, we will have a feel for supply and demand in the contested
areas and investor’s readiness to spend money in the region. Examining property
values and investment levels will allow us to have insight in the projected economic
growth and will serve as a proxy for overall financial performance in the region. We will
test the following three hypotheses:

Yi Feng, Political Freedom, Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty: A Study of Political Institutions
and Private Investment in Developing Countries, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 2,
June 2001, Pages 271–294,
9
Everhart, S. S., & Sumlinski, M. A. (n.d.). Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries
Statistics for 1970-2000 and the Impact on Private Investment of Corruption and the Quality of Public
Investment (pp. 1–69). Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
10
Aizenman, J and N. P. Marion. "Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Private Investment." Economics
Letters 41 (1993): 201-210.
11
Firebaugh, Glenn) "Growth Effects of Foreign and Domestic Investment." American Journal of
Sociology 98 (1992): 105-30.
12
Khan, Molisin S. and Carmen M. Reinhart. "Private Investment and Economic Growth in Developing
Countries." World Development 18 (1990): 19-27.
8
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1. As GDPPC rises above previous performance, the annexed region
successfully integrates into the larger society.
2. As investment rises above previous performance, the annexed region
successfully integrates into the larger society.
3. As property values rise, the annexed region successfully integrates into the
larger region
We expect to see that political instability undermines and eventually reverses the
effects of economic success. The method for testing these hypotheses will be through
analyzing data pre and post integration for each of the contested regions: Kashmir,
Crimea and Hong Kong. This financial analysis will be composed of data visualizations,
showing the trends over time of each of the three variables for each case. I will also
include some summary statistics, showing the numeric values of each of the three
indicators. We will examine the amounts of each variable, controlled for inflation and
then preform a few different calculations to look at the percentage changes from the
previous year, from the date of the event, and the overall rate of change from the date
of the event.

15

Chapter 3
Methodology and Design

16

3.1 Expected Utility Theory
Addressing issues of decision making, the field of international relations has
employed various means for developing theories. Requirements for labeling options,
assigning preference, identifying tradeoffs and stakeholders, has made this field very
complex. This study will use an Expected Utility Theory, as a proven model for decision
making. As Thompson points out, “national security-level decision making postulates
that decision-makers typically utilize compensatory decision rules as they process
information en route to a final choice” 13 Our model will use Expected Utility Theory to
analysis each case of annexation in our study.
Expected Utility Theory was developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita in 1981,
and has been used by scholars to analyze policy since. As Kugler and Feng suggest in
International Interactions, this model has its roots in median voter theorem (developed
by Black in 1958) and the subsequent theory on expectations and conflict escalation
(developed by Black in 1990). 14 “This model is a powerful tool for applied policy
analysis, capable of outlining solutions that the interested parties are unaware of by
identifying appropriate strategies that can alter undesirable outcomes. On the strength
of its axiomatic foundations and rigorous specifications, the model can be used for
academic research in the fields of political science, economics, and sociology.” 15 We
feel that utilizing this model will not only build upon previous research in the
international relations field, but it meets the requirements for a complex decision making

Thompson (2018). The Poliheuristic Theory of Political Decision Making. In The Oxford encyclopedia of
empirical international relations theory (Vol. 3, pp. 56-58). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
14
Kugler & Feng Guest Editors (1997) Foreword, International Interactions, 23:3-4, 233-234
15
Kugler & Feng Guest Editors (1997) Foreword, International Interactions, 23:3-4, 233-234
13
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structure needed for analyzing actions taken by governments to maintain territorial
integrity through annexation.
Bueno de Mesquita explains that Expected Utility Theory, “remains faithful to the
rational choice perspective that suggests that decision makers do what they believe is in
their best interest. Decision makers are modeled as individuals with bounded rationality,
who are not able to look ahead over an unbounded time horizon, but instead see only
one move ahead of their current choice.”

16

Functioning under the assumption that

decision makers are rational actors, our model will start by identifying all stakeholder,
their stance on the issue of annexation, their influence (individual as well as group) and
the salience of the issue to them. In doing so we will arrive at a fully developed scenario
analysis that will allow us to predict the likelihood of a successful annexation.
Setting the precedent for this modeling approach, in 1985 Bueno de Mesquita,
Newman, and Rabushka used the Expected Utility approach to forecast Hong Kong’s
future as it shifted hands from the Great Britain to China. 17 In this book, it is explained
that using Expected Utility Theory allows for the analyzer to truly grasp an
understanding of the various policy choices that are available to decision makers and
forecast decisions and their full implications. In building the Expected Utility Model for
Hong Kong, Bueno de Mesqueita et al, explain that “It is a parsimonious model that
requires only data on the relevant political actors who seek to influence policy, the policy
preference of each actor arrayed on the possible policy continuum, estimates of the

Bueno de Mesquita (1997) A decision making model: Its structure and
form, International Interactions, 23:3-4, 235-266
17
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Newman, D., & Rabushka, A. (1985). Forecasting political events: The future of
Hong Kong. New Haven: Yale University Press.
16
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relevant capabilities of each group, and the salience each group attaches to each issue.
These data are readily available from experts who study given countries or substantive
issues.” 18 Using this model as the basis for our research, we will expand upon it by
applying it to the current annexation of Hong Kong by China.
In 2000, Kugler et al, also employed the Expected Utility Theory to forecast the
future of Kashmir. In this research, the crisis of Kashmir was analyzed from the position
of all key stakeholders. Implications were made for Pakistan, India and the US. Results
of this analysis found that conflict in this region would linger. After the recent events of
the 2019 annexation, an updated analysis is needed and this study will provide that. In
2014, the Crimea annexation was analyzed and predicted by Kugler, using the same
Excepted Utility Model we will employ in this study. 19 The accuracy of its prediction still
stands today and we will update it with the results of this study.

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Newman, D., & Rabushka, A. (1985). Forecasting political events: The future of
Hong Kong. New Haven: Yale University Press.
19
Kugler, “Crimea Crisis: The Future of Ukraine”, Data collection March 23, 2014, Analysis ran on March
25, 2014.
18
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3.2 Theoretical Justification for Political and Economic Link
The decision to pair politics and economics together is founded on previous
research by scholars who have suggested that we cannot look at politics or economics
in a silo. In the Performance of Nations, Tammen and Kugler suggest the value in using
economic indicators to measure the relative power of governments. 20 Their extensive
work on relative political capacity has been expanded to the regional hierarchy in their
recent work on The Rise of Regions. 21
Feng introduces the idea that political stability is directly linked to economic
performance. 22 We have seen in this body of research that theories are stronger when
empirically tested with political as well as economic variables. In Feng’s research, his
research suggests that economic growth is linked to GDP per capita and he states that,
“by design, it is the best indicator of long- run economic growth”. 23 His work also found
evidence that political stability is linked to investment and property rights. Building on
this research, we will include these variable in our study on annexation and economic
growth to see if they also have a relationship. We suspect that annexation is similar to
political stability and that the relationship he identified will also apply here.
Building on this idea, the second half of this study will take an extensive dive to
finance, as we establish a dataset to look at three economic indicators of market
performance. The dataset will include: GDP per capita, investment and property values
Kugler, J., & Tammen, R. L. (2012). The performance of nations. Lanham, MD: Rowman &amp;
Littlefield.
21
Tammen, R. L., & Kugler, J. (2020). The rise of regions: Conflict and cooperation. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, an imprint of The Rowman &amp; Littfield Publishing Group.
22
Feng, Y. (2003). Democracy, governance, and economic performance: Theory and evidence.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
23
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in each region. It will be analyzed in relation to the date of each annexation to test the
hypotheses of whether these indicators rise as a result of successful annexation. The
effort to collect and translate this data was extensive, and datasets will be available to
researchers in the appendix.
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Chapter 4
Political Analysis Results
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4.1 Political Analysis in Crimea
Building upon research by Kugler in 2014, this study updates the Crimea crisis
for where it stands today in 2020. 24 Initial research from 2014, predicted that the
annexation of Crimea would stand. Kugler set forth that this annexation would become
the new status quo for Crimea, and we find that this was an accurate prediction. In
2014, the majority of the population supported the Russian incorporation and we find
that this is still true. Even if there were some opposed to this annexation, Kugler’s
research suggest that the Russian military would have the power to quiet any
disturbances to this new status quo.
The identification of external resistance to this annexation has been consistent
since 2014. Members of the EU and United States oppose Russia’s actions, but as we
see from the results of the analysis, this does not seem to be very impactful on the
success of the annexation by Russia. Crimea’s incorporation into Russia stands.
The 2020 political analysis shows that as expected, Crimea supports the Russian
annexation. We see that there is continued external opposition by EU, US and UK. This
fact has not changed since the initial annexation in 2014. In addition, we see that crisis,
prompted by an escalation of the continuing border dispute between, Donetsk and
Luhansk, may again prompt open confrontation.

Crimea Results from initial 2014 analysis/ base case:

Kugler, “Crimea Crisis: The Future of Ukraine”, Data collection March 23, 2014, Analysis ran on March
25, 2014.
24
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In the above base case from 2014, we see where all of the stakeholders stood at
the time of the crisis. Russia was obviously the most supportive of their annexation of
Crimea, all the way on the left at the 0 position. We see the population of Crimea is the
closest other agent in support of their own annexation. We then have the Stans closer
to indifference, but on the side towards annexation. China is at the median position,
which is indifference towards the event. The rest of the stakeholders: EU, Japan,
Turkey, US, and the rest of Eastern Europe and the UK are in opposition to the
annexation.
In 2020, we updated these positions and saw that the base case was very similar
to what it was at the time of the crisis. Crimea still supports the Russian annexation. The
external opposition by the EU, US and UK has not changed either. The crisis prompted
by an escalation of the continuing border dispute (Donetsk and Luhansk) may once
more prompt open confrontation.
24

Crimea results 2020:

In the results from 2020, we see that the entire set of stakeholders seem to be on
the side closer to supporting Crimea as a part of Ukraine. It is quite interesting to see
that does not have much of an impact on the success of annexation. Russia and the
people of Crimea support the annexation into Russia. China is slightly indifferent, just
over the median position. We see that the US, many members of the EU, and Japan are
completely on the Ukrainian side, opposing the annexation. The most important factor
seems to be local support for the annexation. If a country has this, the annexation can
25

obviously stand up against external resistance which really appears to be largely
irrelevant.
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4.2 Political Analysis in Kashmir
In the case of Kashmir, we shall first look at the base case and where all of the
actors initially stand. We see that Pakistan groups, China and Khan are on the side of
the opposition. These stances range from wanting Kashmir to be unified with Pakistan
to a slightly less strong position of simply integration. At the position of 30, we see the
population of Kashmir that wants a unified independent state for themselves. We see
that Asia, UN, Japan, UK, Media against, and the Muslim Party Congress are wanting
an autonomous India Kashmir. India’s business group is between that position and
wanting Kashmir integrated into India. Wanting integration with India, we see the
stakeholders: US, India’s military, media that is pro, and BJP. Modi is close to that
stance as well. Russia is on the far right position.
Our analysis shows that these initial conditions have some opportunities for
movement. Initially (Round 1) India holds a dominant position as multiple domestic and
foreign actors oppose change, as explained above. However, immediately after Modi’s
annexation (R1-3) Khan has an opportunity to persuade Modi to reverse course, but this
option soon dissipates (R4). We see that over time Modi can persuade Khan, The
Pakistan Military, Foreign actors and all India faction to accept the new status of
Kashmir (R5-10). Once consolidation takes place, the only opposition will come from
Kashmir rebels in Pakistan that have very limited support (R8-10). We expect that
India’s annexation of its portion of Kashmir will not generate strong opposition from
foreign actors, International Organizations and will be accepted by Pakistan Military and
government. However, cross border terrorist activity and internal opposition within
Kashmir may follow with very limited external support.
27

Kashmir Results for the Base Case:

Kashmir results from run 5, 8, 10:
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In the above Round 5, we see that most of the Pakistan groups are still in the 010 positions of opposition want Kashmir to unify or integrate with Pakistan. The
population of Kashmir is not moved yet, and still seeks for an independent Kashmir.
However, the other agents have slightly moved towards India’s annexation of the
region.
Results round 8 and 10:
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The above analysis from rounds 8 and 10, show that most all agents have been
moved towards India’s annexation of Kashmir. This analysis shows that Modi has the
opportunity to move stakeholder’s away from opposing this annexation. There may still
be some opposition from Pakistan TR, but even they move away from the position of
Kashmir unifying with Pakistan. Overtime, there is an opportunity for Modi to move the
population of Kashmir into support for integration into India and closer to Kashmir being
unified with India. If this local support occurs, the chances of India’s annexation of
Kashmir becoming the status quo is more likely.
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4.3 Political Analysis Hong Kong
In the analysis of Hong Kong, we see the potential for independence. This
movement towards further autonomy in Hong Kong will continue with all parties stuck in
their own positions. As the below run shows, China is at the median so if no change will
stick. The analysis does show opportunities for the opposition to emerge, and if
exercised, this would move China Xi and supporters to autonomy as demanded by the
opposition. These results are somewhat surprising, as we see that the median moves
with opposition. The below run shows no change in rounds 1-3. At the median position,
China can hold back but not persuade HK opposition to shift their stance. It appears that
only the opposition has the ability to move China.
In the below charts, we see that there was no movement from Round 1 to round
3. This indicates a stalemate. The median position is at 100. Therefore, Beijing can
impose its policy – as they eventually did, since this analysis was run on 5/26/2020. We
see that none of the pro-democracy actors move towards the new imposed status quo
indicating continued resistance. China can impose politically but it is not clear if they can
improve property rights and investment, but if they fail in these areas continued
confrontation will persist. We see that contiguity helps (unlike Panama) because the
relative size of the parties is massively disproportional.
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Hong Kong Results (base case):

Hong Kong Results (rounds 1-3 are the same):
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Chapter 5
Financial Analysis Results
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5.1 Description of Financial Data
Please refer to tables in the appendix for data proxies, definitions, date ranges and
sources of what has been collected for the purposes of this study. In the case of
Crimea, data is examined for the period of 2005-2018, which will give us a reasonable
sample from both prior to and post, annexation which occurred between February and
March of 2014. We examined the Gross Regional Product per Capita from both the
Ukrainian and Russian Federal State Statistics Websites: Ukrstat and Rosstat. The
2005-2013 data was from Ukrstat, because this was the period of time that Crimea was
monitored by Ukraine. The 2014-2018 data is from Rossat, because this was the point
at which the annexation had occurred and Russia began to record statistics for the
state. The data used for GRPPC was controlled for inflation using the GDP Deflator
from 2018. The data generated for this study is therefore referred to as constant 2018.
The definition of GRP is: “Gross regional product (GRP) is a general indicator of the
economic activity of a region that characterizes the process of production of goods and
services for final use. At the same time, GRP is the gross value added created by
residents of the region, and is defined as the difference between output and
intermediate consumption, GRP is calculated at current basic prices and at constant
prices. Key prices include production prices for the industry, subsidies on products, but
exclude taxes on products.” 25
For investment, the measure used was Fixed Capital Investment (RUB mil) that was
obtained from the Ukrainian and Russian Federal State Statistics Websites: Ukrstat and

Gross State Value Added by economic activity at current prices. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://data.gov.in/
25
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Rosstat. All of the investment and property value data was also controlled for inflation
by using CPI (Consumer Price Index) and to data was also translated into the same
currency (RUB). The definition of fixed capital investment is: “Fixed capital investments a set of costs aimed at construction, reconstruction (including expansion and
modernization) of facilities that lead to an increase in their initial cost, the purchase of
cars, equipment, vehicles, production and household inventory, whose accounting is
carried out in the manner prescribed for accounting investments in non-current assets,
investments in intellectual property.” 26 Data from the 2006-2013 period was obtained
from Ukrstat, the Ukrainian statistics site. The 2014-2018 data was from Rossat, the
Russian statistics site. To examine the real estate market in Crimea, we looked at data
from the Federal State Service on House Prices on the Secondary Market and REM
Navigator. The data from 2008-2013 was obtained from REM Navigator for the period
where the region was Ukrainian and then the 2014-2018 data was from Rossat.
For Kashmir, we will examine Gross State Domestic Product per Capita for Jammu
and Kashmir that is available Directorate of Economics and Statistics of the respective
State/Uts. Data on investment will be obtained from the World Bank, and we will
examine Federal Direct Investment (FDI). 27 The better measure for investment, is really
domestic invested capital and I will include this data, but the limitation here is that the
government has not released 2019 invested capital data so we cannot rely solely on
that data for the purposes of this study since the annexation occurred in 2019. Real

26
State Statistics Service of Ukraine documents publishing. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://ukrstat.org/en/operativ/operativ2013/ibd/iki_reg/iki_reg_e/arh_ikreg for 2006-2013; Federal State
Statistic Service. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.gks.ru/accounts for 2014-2018, the Ukraine data for
2006-2013 was translated into Ruble
27
Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade: MoCI: GoI. (n.d.). Retrieved September 06,
2020, from https://dipp.gov.in/publications/fdi-statistics
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Estate data will be obtained from the government website for Jammu and Kashmir,
under the land rates subset. We will look at Average Real Value of Residential Plot per
Kanal. All data for Kashmir will also be controlled for inflation, using CPI (Consumer
Price Index). Tables in the appendix will list all data used in this study, so that the
reader may be able to duplicate the results of this study.
For Hong Kong, we will examine the Gross Domestic Product per Capital and
Federal Direct Investment (FDI) data available from the World Bank, and for the housing
market, we will look at the house price data from the property market statistics available
on the Hong Kong’s government website. All data will also be controlled for inflation
using CPI (Consumer Price Index), as in the previous case studies. The World Bank
defines GDPPC as: GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear
population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation
of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in
constant local currency.” 28 The definition of gross capital formation is, “Gross capital
formation (formerly gross domestic investment) consists of outlays on additions to the
fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets
include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and
equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including
schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial

GDP per capita (constant LCU) - Hong Kong SAR, China. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KN?locations=HK&view=chart
28
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buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or
unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in progress." According to the
1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation.” 29 For a
more complete list of each variable, by country, time period, definition and data source,
please refer to the appendix.

Gross capital formation (% of GDP)- Hong Kong SAR, China. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://data.worldbank.org
29
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5.2 Financial Analysis in Crimea
In the below analysis, the chart shows the Gross Regional Product per Capita in
constant 2018 prices. The analysis is showing the period of 2005 to 2018. The
annexation of Crimea occurred in 2014 by Russia. All of the data was translated into the
same currency and controlled for inflation.
In the below table we are looking at the actual GRPPC amounts, then the
percentage change from the previous year, the percentage change from 2014, and then
the rate of change (ROC) from 2014.
Crimea Gross Regional Product per Capita (constant 2018), 2005-2018
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

GRPPC (constant 2018) % Change from Previous Year
14,553.86
18,250.91
25.40
23,822.38
30.53
31,311.09
31.44
31,389.94
0.25
37,188.96
18.47
43,857.59
17.93
51,084.97
16.48
53,157.65
4.06
86,660.69
63.03
120,580.43
39.14
147,951.55
22.70
155,969.83
5.42
176,354.66
13.07

% Change from 2014
16.79
21.06
27.49
36.13
36.22
42.91
50.61
58.95
61.34
100.00
139.14
170.73
179.98
203.50

ROC from 2014
8,011.87
8,551.22
8,976.90
9,224.93
11,054.15
12,367.93
14,267.70
17,787.86
33,503.04
0.00
33,919.74
30,645.43
23,103.05
22,423.49

The below figure shows the actual values in Crimea for Gross Regional Product
per Capita at constant 2018 prices for the 2005-2018 time period. The figure is marked
for the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia. We see that post annexation, Crimea’s
overall GRPPC increased at a pretty rapid rate between 2014-2018. In the years prior to
the annexation, the GRPPC never increased above 52,000. After the annexation
GRPPC rose to 176,354.66 by 2018.
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Crimea, Gross Regional Product per Capita 2005-2018 (constant 2018)
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Figure 1 in the appendix shows Gross Regional Product per Capita, percent
change from the previous year and compares this number with the percent change from
the point of annexation in 2014. We can see that in 2018, there was a 203.5% change
from the year of annexation (2014). This is a very significant increase compared to the
previous year change percentages which range from 0.25%-63.03%. In addition, we
also see that percentage change from 2014 in the years prior to the annexation (20052013), the percentage change always remains below 100%.
In the below analysis, the chart shows the investment data gathered for Crimea.
In this study we will look at the real fixed capital investment (RUB mil) as a proxy for
investment. The analysis is showing the period of 2006 to 2018. The annexation of
Crimea occurred in 2014 by Russia. All of the data was translated into the same
currency and controlled for inflation.
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In the below table we are looking at the actual real fixed capital investment (RUB
mil) amounts, then the percentage change from the previous year, the percentage
change from 2014, and then the rate of change (ROC) from 2014.

Crimea Investment, 2006-2007 (all numbers controlled for inflation)

Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Real Fixed Capital Investment
(RUB mil) % Change from Previous Year
12,238.17
27,351.74
123.50
59,473.37
117.44
73,437.25
23.48
53,346.18
-27.36
42,048.46
-21.18
30,964.60
-26.36
98,794.69
219.06
116,781.34
18.21
416,023.60
256.24
296,187.26
-28.81
406,822.67
37.35
480,499.52
18.11

% Change from 2014
10.48
23.42
50.93
62.88
45.68
36.01
26.52
84.60
100.00
356.24
253.63
348.36
411.45

ROC from 2014
13,067.90
12,775.66
9,551.33
8,668.82
15,858.79
24,910.96
42,908.37
17,986.65
0.00
299,242.26
89,702.96
96,680.44
90,929.55

In the below figure we see the amount of real fixed capital investment for 20062018. The figure is marked at 2014, since that is the year that Russia annexed Crimea.
We see that capital investment dramatically increased in the first two years of
annexation when Russia took over control of the region. In the years prior to the
annexation, Ukraine data shows us that capital investment never made it above
98,794.69 (RUB mil), but in the year of annexation we see that number increase to
116,781.34 (RUB mil) and then in 2015 it shoots up to 416,023.60 (RUB mil). This
dramatic increase was met by a dip in 2016 to 296,187.26, but in 2017 and 2018
investment was again well over the 400,000 (RUB mil) mark that we had previously
seen. This shows us that investment greatly increases once the small country is
annexed by the major power. Although we may see that investors may feel risk aversion
40

during the initial 3 years, this is soon overcome and in the case of Crimea, we see
economic activity flourishing.

Crimea, Real Fixed Capital Investment 2006-2018 (RUB mil)
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Figure 2 in the appendix compares the real fixed capital investment (RUB mil)
percentage change from the previous year to the percentage change from 2014, the
year of annexation. In 2018, there was a 411.45% change from the annexation in 2014,
whereas the percentage change from the previous year(s) fluctuates between -28.81%
to 256.24%.
In the below analysis, the chart shows the real estate data gathered for Crimea.
In this study we will look at the real house price on the secondary market (RUB) as a
proxy for the real estate market. The analysis is showing the period of 2008 to 2018.
The annexation of Crimea occurred in 2014 by Russia. All of the data was translated
into the same currency and controlled for inflation.
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In the below table we are looking at the actual real house prices on the
secondary market (RUB) amounts, then the percentage change from the previous year,
the percentage change from 2014, and then the rate of change (ROC) from 2014.

Crimea Real Estate Market, 2008-2018 (all numbers controlled for inflation)

Year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Real House Price on the Average Real Estate Prices (%
Secondary Market (RUB)
Change from Previous Year)
15,414.68
17,826.06
15.64
33,200.01
86.24
29,284.38
-11.79
46,758.39
59.67
33,670.36
-27.99
35,385.41
5.09
15,274.92
-56.83
21,410.11
40.17
42,561.07
98.79
57,240.00
34.49

% Change from 2014
43.56
50.38
93.82
82.76
132.14
95.15
100.00
43.17
60.51
120.28
161.76

ROC from 2014
3,328.46
3,511.87
546.35
2,033.68
-5,686.49
1,715.05
0.00
-20,110.49
-6,987.65
2,391.89
5,463.65

*Data on house prices is from the last recorded month of the year for 2008-2015, 2016-2018 is the average

The below figure shows the real house prices on the secondary market amounts
for period of 2008-2018 in RUB. This chart is also marked at the point of Crimea’s
annexation by Russia in 2014. As the figure indicates, we see that the in first year
following the annexation in 2015, the real estate market prices dropped significantly
which is most likely a result of buyer’s apprehension to the initial political changes. We
see that after this initial decrease, the market recovers at a rapid rate that was
significantly higher than pre-annexation. In Crimea, we continue to see that the
annexation by Russia helped to booster the economic condition through the real estate
market.
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Crimea, Real House Prices on the Secondary Market 2008-2018
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Figure 3 in the appendix shows the real house prices on the secondary market
percentage change from the previous year and the percentage change from 2014 which
was the point of annexation. In 2018, there was a 161.76% change from 2014,
compared to the percentage change from previous year(s) at -56.83 to 98.79.
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5.2.1 Implications Financial Analysis in Crimea
As we will discussed in the above sections, the data indicates that as the
annexation by Russia was successful, the GDPPC, investment and real estate market
improved. The implication is that political stability through incorporation into a major
power, results in a rising economy for the smaller state. We also see interesting
opportunities for investment in the property in the years immediately following the
annexation. Our data indicates that there is an initial dip immediately following the
annexation in 2015. However, we see that the real estate market recovers with rates far
exceeding previous years, as the annexation by the major power stabilizes. Potential
buyers may want to pay attention to the local support for the annexation and assess the
strength of the annexation. If it appears to be supported and successful, this year
following the annexation provides an opportunity to increase funds greatly. In the case
of Crimea, if property was purchased in 2015, we see a large increase in investment
value in the following years.
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5.3 Financial Analysis in Kashmir
In the below analysis, the chart shows the Gross Regional Product per Capita in
constant 2012 prices. The analysis is showing the period of 2012 to 2019. The
annexation of Kashmir occurred in 2019 by India. All of the data was translated into the
same currency and controlled for inflation.
In the below table we are looking at the actual GRPPC amounts, then the
percentage change from the previous year, the percentage change from 2019, and then
the rate of change (ROC) from 2019.

Kashmir Gross Regional Product per Capita (constant 2012), 2012-2019
Year
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

GRPPC (constant 2012)
61852.31432
62877.83006
65267.61475
62219.2861
72168.24662
73816.49874
76877.14229
80264.98056

% Change from Previous Year
1.66
3.80
-4.67
15.99
2.28
4.15
4.41

% Change from 2019
77.06
78.34
81.32
77.52
89.91
91.97
95.78
100.00

ROC from 2019
2,630.38
2,897.86
2,999.47
4,511.42
2,698.91
3,224.24
3,387.84
0.00

The below figure shows the actual values in Kashmir for Gross Regional Product
per Capita at constant 2012 prices for the 2012-2019 time period. The figure is marked
for the 2019 annexation of Kashmir by India. Since the annexation occurred in 2019, we
are not able to see the post annexation results. We expect to see that post annexation,
Kashmir’s overall GRPPC will also continue to increase.
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Figure 4 in the appendix shows the Gross Regional Product per Capita, percent
change from the previous year. In the figure we see that 2019 marks the point of
Kashmir annexation by India, and there was an increase of 4.41% in GRPPC in 2019. I
did not include a visual representation of the percentage change from 2019 since the
event was so recent, although the above table does show the change pre-annexation in
years 2012-2018.

In the below analysis, the chart shows the investment data gathered for Kashmir.
I am showing the invested capital data, but the government has not released the 2019
data at this time. So, for the purposed of this study we will look at the federal direct
investment (Rs. In Lakh) as a proxy for investment. The analysis is showing the period
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of 2014 to 2019. The annexation of Kashmir occurred in 2019 by India. All of the data
was controlled for inflation using the consumer price index (CPI).
In the below table we are looking at the FDI (Rs. In Lakh, constant 2019 price)
amounts, then the percentage change from the previous year, the percentage change
from 2019, and then the rate of change (ROC) from 2019.

Kashmir, Investment 2014-2019 (constant 2019 prices)
Year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

FDI (Rs. in Lakh, constant 2019 prices)
4,108.36
1,676.11
863.68
481.50
0.00
41.00

% Change from Previous Year
-59.20
-48.47
-44.25
-100.00

% Change from 2019
10,020.39
4,088.07
2,106.53
1,174.39
0.00
100.00

ROC from 2019
4,077.46
1,638.35
823.90
440.94
-41.02
0.00

In the below figure we see the amount of FDI (Rs. In Lakh, constant 2019 prices)
for 2014-2019. The figure is marked at 2019, since that is the year that India annexed
Kashmir. Unlike the other case, we see that the amount of FDI prior to the annexation
was very high in 2014 and steady decreased to the point where the annexation
occurred. In the year prior to the annexation, in 2018, we see that FDI actually was
zero, so rising to 41 at the time of annexation was actually an increase. Since this event
just occurred in 2019, we can only propose that we might expect to see an increase in
FDI, like we did in the case of Crimea.
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Kashmir, FDI 2014-2019 (Rs. in Lakh, constant 2019 prices)
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I am also including a graph showing the invested capital, since domestic investment is a
better indicator. Since the government has not released 2019 data, we will not rely on it
for the purposes of this study but I still think it is valuable to examine 2012-2018.

Kashmir, Invested Capital (Rs. in Lakh, constant 2018 prices),
2012-2018
3000000
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
0

1

2

3

4

5

Invested Capital (Rs. in Lakh, constant 2018 prices)

48

6

7

Figure 5 in the appendix shows the federal direct investment percentage change
from the previous year. We are not visually representing the percentage change from
2019, since this is too recent to have any post annexation comparison results. Although
the above table does have the pre-annexation percentage changes from 2019 for us to
examine and the rate of change since 2019. In 2018, FDI dropped to zero and in the
2019 annexation it raised to 41 (Rs. in Lahk, constant 2019), which makes the
percentage change from the previous here infinitive and we cannot show a graphical
representation of a calculation with zero in the denominator.
In the below analysis, the chart shows the real estate data gathered for Kashmir.
In this study we will look at the average real value of residential plot of land per Kanal
(Rs. in Lacs) as a proxy for the real estate market. The analysis is showing the period of
2014 to 2021. The annexation of Kashmir occurred in 2019 by India. All of the data was
controlled for inflation. The 2020 and 2021 numbers are government projections of the
estimated values of residential land.
In the below table we are looking at the average real value of residential plot of
land per Kanal (Rs. in Lacs) amounts, then the percentage change from the previous
year, the percentage change from 2019, and then the rate of change (ROC) from 2019.

Kashmir, Real Estate Market 2014-2021 (all prices controlled for inflation)

49

Year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

Average Real Value of Residential
Avg. Real Value of Residential Plot per Kanal Plot per Kanal (Ra in Lacs) (% change
(Rs in Lacs)
from previous year)
31.1578157
37.92574367
21.72
130.1561435
243.19
73.188
-43.77
73.95251908
1.04
41.38
-44.05
63.79695067
54.17
64.94749561
1.80

% Change from 2019
75.30
91.65
314.54
176.87
178.72
100.00
154.17
156.95

ROC from 2019
-10.25
-3.46
88.91
31.84
32.59
0.00
22.41
23.54

*2021 value of residental plot is a government projection, CPI for 2021 used the .138 average increase from 2014-2020 to project the rate in 2021

The below figure shows the average real value of residential plots per Kanal (Rs.
in Lacs) amounts for period of 2014-2021. This chart is also marked at the point of
Kashmir’s annexation by India in 2019. As the figure indicates, we see that the in first
year following the annexation in 2019, the real estate market prices are expected to
rise. In case of Kashmir, we know that the government decided to open up the real
estate market to external non-Indian buyers, which might be some of the reason for the
continued growth. However, it is important to remember that 2020 and 2021 are based
on government projections and we might see a decrease like in the case of Crimea if
investors get weary of buying in a political unstable climate. Even if this does occur, we
would expect to eventually see the market recover and that the value of residential land
will significantly increase after Kashmir’s annexation into the more dominant India.
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Kashmir, Avg. Real Value of Residential Plot per Kanal 2014-2021
(Rs in Lacs)
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Figure 6 in the appendix shows the average real value of residential plot per
Kanal (Rs in Lacs) percentage change from the previous year and the percentage
change from 2019 which was the point of annexation. In 2021, there is projected to be a
156.95% change from 2019.
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5.3.1 Implications of Financial Analysis in Kashmir
We expected to see that the case of Kashmir will be a successful annexation, as
predicted by the political analysis. Our results indicated that the local population of
Kashmir has the potential to move towards support for the annexation of India, over
time. We do not expect to see this support to be as strong as in the case of Crimea, and
the initial financial results also indicate that there is not that initial financial spike real
estate like we saw in Crimea. We do expect to see the GDPPC rise, investment rise and
property values rise in this case, as the annexation stabilizes. It is interesting to see that
government projections for real estate are flat in the years immediately following the
annexation. This implies that the government thinks the market will continue to be stable
and not decline. We are not sure if this will hold true or not. In the case of Kashmir, the
government did decide to open the real estate market up to nonresidents, which will
present an interesting investment opportunity.
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5.4 Financial Analysis in Hong Kong
In the below analysis, the chart shows the Gross Regional Product per Capita in
constant LCU. The analysis is showing the period of 1999 to 2019. The annexation of
Hong Kong is marked by the Communist National Meeting where the decision to
reverse the “one country, two systems” model. All of the data was controlled for
inflation.
In the below table we are looking at the actual GRPPC amounts, then the
percentage change from the previous year, the percentage change from 2019, and then
the rate of change (ROC) from 2019.

Hong Kong GDP per capita (constant LCU), 1999-2019
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Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

GDPPC (constant
LCU) % Change from Previous Year
204573.8288
1.53
218318.0795
6.72
217930.5363
-0.18
220561.9727
1.21
227752.1246
3.26
245,643.40
7.86
262,641.93
6.92
279,312.83
6.35
294,824.26
5.55
299,302.08
1.52
291,313.96
-2.67
308,753.17
5.99
321,449.46
4.11
323,325.83
0.58
332,016.60
2.69
338,800.19
2.04
343,949.91
1.52
349,242.02
1.54
359,779.75
3.02
367,129.78
2.04
360,041.96
-1.93

% Change from 2019
56.82
60.64
60.53
61.26
63.26
68.23
72.95
77.58
81.89
83.13
80.91
85.75
89.28
89.80
92.22
94.10
95.53
97.00
99.93
101.97
100.00

ROC from 2019
7,773.41
7,459.15
7,895.08
8,204.71
8,268.11
7,626.57
6,957.14
6,209.93
5,434.81
5,521.81
6,872.80
5,698.75
4,824.06
5,245.16
4,670.89
4,248.35
4,023.01
3,599.98
131.10
-7,087.82

The below figure shows the actual values in Hong Kong for Gross Regional
Product per Capita at constant LCU for the 1999-2019 time period. The figure is marked
for the 2019 Communist National Meeting where the decision to reverse the “one
country, two systems model” was reversed by China. Since the annexation occurred in
2019, we are not able to see the post annexation results.
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Hong Kong, GDPPC 1999-2019 (constant LCU)
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Figure 7 in the appendix shows the Gross Regional Product per Capita, percent
change from the previous year. In the figure we see that 2019 marks the point of the
Communist National Meeting where the decision to reverse the “one country, two
systems model” was reversed by China, and there was a decrease of -1.93% in GRPPC
in 2019. I did not include a visual representation of the percentage change from 2019
since the event was so recent, although the above table does show the change preannexation in years 1999-2018.
In the below analysis, the chart shows the investment data gathered for Hong
Kong. In this study we will look at the gross capital formation (% of GDP) as a proxy for
investment. The analysis is showing the period of 1999 to 2019. The National
Communist Meeting in 2019 by China, marks the decision point to reverse the “one
country, two systems model”.
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In the below table we are looking at the gross capital formation (% of GDP), then
the percentage change from the previous year, the percentage change from 2019, and
then the rate of change (ROC) from 2019.

Hong Kong Investment, 1999-2019

In the below figure we see the amount of gross capital formation (% of GDP) for
1999-2019. The National Communist Meeting in 2019 by China, marks the decision
point to reverse the “one country, two systems model”. We see that the amount of
investment are fairly stable, but drop in the year of the annexation. In 2019, we actually
see the lowest amount of investment.
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Hong Kong, Gross capital formation (% of GDP), 1999-2019
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Figure 8 in the appendix shows the gross capital formation (% of GDP)
percentage change from the previous year. We are not visually representing the
percentage change from 2019, since this is too recent to have any post annexation
comparison results. Although the above table does have the pre-annexation percentage
changes from 2019 for us to examine and the rate of change since 2019.
In the below analysis, the chart shows the real estate data gathered for Hong
Kong. In this study we will look at the real house prices in constant 2019 prices, as a
proxy for the real estate market. The analysis is showing the period of 1999 to 2019.
The National Communist Meeting, where the decision to reverse the “one country, two
systems” model was in 2019. All of the data was controlled for inflation.
In the below table we are looking at the real house prices in constant 2019 prices
amounts, then the percentage change from the previous year, the percentage change
from 2019, and then the rate of change (ROC) from 2019.
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Hong Kong, Real Estate Market 1999-2019 (constant 2019)

Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Real House Price (constant
2019) % Change from Previous Year
179774.8224
171151.7559
-4.80
156608.1303
-8.50
183152.7618
16.95
181476.6247
-0.92
257,528.65
41.91
276,539.31
7.38
241,823.69
-12.55
346,019.68
43.09
325,271.10
-6.00
405,064.17
24.53
405,816.90
0.19
525,064.29
29.38
609,995.87
16.18
615,087.52
0.83
504,075.16
-18.05
613,429.59
21.69
501,785.06
-18.20
555,338.92
10.67
509,193.74
-8.31
504,665.00
-0.89

% Change from 2019
35.62
33.91
31.03
36.29
35.96
51.03
54.80
47.92
68.56
64.45
80.26
80.41
104.04
120.87
121.88
99.88
121.55
99.43
110.04
100.90
100.00

ROC from 2019
16,244.51
17,553.33
19,336.49
18,912.48
20,199.27
16,475.76
16,294.69
20,218.56
13,220.44
16,308.54
9,960.08
10,983.12
-2,549.91
-15,047.27
-18,403.75
117.97
-27,191.15
959.98
-25,336.96
-4,528.74

The below figure shows the average amounts for period of 1999-2019. This chart
is also marked at real house prices in constant 2019 the point of the National
Communist Meeting, where the decision was made to reverse the “one country, two
systems” model. Since the annexation is marked in 2019, and the government did not
publish real estate projections, like in the case of Kashmir, we do not have a definite
indication on how this event will impact the real estate market. We can expect that
market may take an initial hit, as investors may be apprehensive to buy property.
However, as long as the stability of the annexation occurs, we can expect to see that
the market will recover.

58

Hong Kong, Real House Prices 1999-2019 (constant 2019)
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Figure 9 in the appendix shows the real house prices in constant 2019 the point
of the National Communist Meeting, percentage change from the previous year. We did
not include the visual representation of the percentage change since 2019, since the
event just occurred and the Chinese government has not published projection for 2020
and 2021. In 2019, the HK real estate market experienced house prices that had a 0.89% change from the previous year.
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5.4.1 Implications of Financial Analysis in Hong Kong
As the above analysis indicated, it is difficult to make actual assessments of the
annexation’s success at this point. However, we can see that the rocky financial records
between 2015-2019, indicate a decline in the overall economic performance of Hong
Kong. This is directly in alignment with the political unrest during this period. We have
seen that local opposition to the annexation by China is also reflected in a declining
economy. This may indicate that the annexation of Hong Kong will not be as successful
as the major power of China hopes. Our political analysis also indicates that there is a
chance for autonomy in Hong Kong. In the future, we expect to see continued political
and economic troubles in the region. If China is able to successfully annex Hong Kong,
then the economy may improve. However, if the annexation fails then we may see a
independent Hong Kong. Either way, it will probably be clearly seen through their
financial markets.
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Chapter 6
Summary of Findings
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Expanding on the results of this analysis, we find that three primary points can be
drawn. First of which, is that the support of the local population seems to be the
strongest determinant of successful annexation. The reverse is also true, if political
annexation is contested, it may fail without this domestic support. The second point
identified, is that results confirm that international support is only marginally relevant.
Although strong international opposition may exist, with the support of local populations,
this opposition simply does not matter. Finally, we find that as annexation stabilizes and
becomes the new status quo, the economy rises. Our results at this point as still
tentative, since the events in Kashmir and Hong Kong will need to be analyzed in the
future year’s post-2019. Generally, GDPPC grows and we see that investment and
property values rise. The market may experience an initial dip in investment and real
estate, as potential purchasers are unsure of the annexation, but quickly within one to
two years, the market rises well above pre-annexation. We expect that without this
strong local support for the annexation, resulting in an unsuccessful annexation, the
economy suffers. This can be seen in the unstable period in Hong Kong between 20152019. We tentatively expect that as the economy declines when strong local opposition
to the annexation. We think this will be a telltale sign of internal difficulty—politically and
economically.
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GDPPC, Summary Table with all Cases
Crimea GDPPC (constant
Year 2018)
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
14,553.86
2006
18,250.91
2007
23,822.38
2008
31,311.09
2009
31,389.94
2010
37,188.96
2011
43,857.59
2012
51,084.97
2013
53,157.65
2014
86,660.69
2015
120,580.43
2016
147,951.55
2017
155,969.83
2018
176,354.66
2019
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Hong Kong GDPPC (constant Kashmir GDPPC (constant
LCU) 2012)
204573.8288
218318.0795
217930.5363
220561.9727
227752.1246
245,643.40
262,641.93
279,312.83
294,824.26
299,302.08
291,313.96
308,753.17
321,449.46
323,325.83
61852.31432
332,016.60
62877.83006
338,800.19
65267.61475
343,949.91
62219.2861
349,242.02
72168.24662
359,779.75
73816.49874
367,129.78
76877.14229
360,041.96
80264.98056

Investment, Summary Table with all Cases

Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

64

Crimea, Real Fixed Capital
Investment (RUB mil)

12,238.17
27,351.74
59,473.37
73,437.25
53,346.18
42,048.46
30,964.60
98,794.69
116,781.34
416,023.60
296,187.26
406,822.67
480,499.52

Kashmir, FDI (Rs. in Lakh,
constant 2019 prices)

4,108.36
1,676.11
863.68
481.50
0.00
41.00

Hong Kong, Gross Capital
Formation (% of GDP)
24.97950925
27.58240928
25.49120382
23.18095242
22.37964014
22.35743374
21.05982119
22.28514831
21.3960755
21.04121437
21.84686409
23.89046642
24.1431843
25.22013354
24.03038856
23.82246942
21.54147973
21.50878681
22.07090063
21.99739624
18.91107608

Real Estate Market, Summary Table with all Cases

Year

Kashmir, Avg.
Real Value of
Residential
Crimea, Real House Price on the Plot per Kanal
Secondary Market (RUB) (Rs in Lacs)

1999

179774.8224

2000

171151.7559

2001

156608.1303

2002

183152.7618

2003

181476.6247

2004

257,528.65

2005

276,539.31

2006

241,823.69

2007

346,019.68

2008

15,414.68

325,271.10

2009

17,826.06

405,064.17

2010

33,200.01

405,816.90

2011

29,284.38

525,064.29

2012

46,758.39

609,995.87

2013

33,670.36

615,087.52

2014

35,385.41

31.1578157

504,075.16

2015

15,274.92

37.92574367

613,429.59

2016

21,410.11

130.1561435

501,785.06

2017

42,561.07

73.188

555,338.92

2018

57,240.00

73.95251908

509,193.74

2019

41.38

504,665.00

2020*

63.79695067

2021*

64.94749561

*These are government
projections
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Hong Kong, Real House Price (constant
2019)

Chapter 7
Conclusion
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This research aims at understanding annexation and its full impact in the nuclear
era. Unlike other studies, this one seeks to tie the two worlds of financial markets and
politics together, by exploring the consequences of annexation in a political and
financial sense. We began this volume with a brief review of historic cases were
annexation was successful and when it was not. We found that in cases such as the
Panama and Suez Canal, when contested areas have independent self-sustaining
wealth, major powers fail at annexation. In contrast, when smaller areas are weaker and
will financially benefit from annexation, the major power is successful, as in the case of
Hawaii.
We have also explored the topics of negotiation, bargaining, influence, and have
arrived at a fully developed scenario analysis of the likelihood of integration in the three
major cases of annexation in the past 20 years. This political analysis provides the
foundation for this study, but by exploring the economic consequences as well, we have
provided a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding and defining success in
annexation. We have accomplished this by looking at the fully financial implication from
the stand point of the smaller region and the dominant power. We see how this impacts
the economy, investment and property values. Our goal has been to push research
forward for policy makers by providing recommendations and implications for all parties
involved in annexation and this has been accomplished.
The premise of this study was to test the hypotheses laid forth for political and
financial analyzes. We have confirmed that successful political annexation requires
support of the local population. International pressure is irrelevant. In addition, this study
confirms that political annexation is contested and may fail without local population
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support. The support of local population results in rising property rights and rising
investment. International support is marginally relevant for great power annexation.
From a financial perspective, our results are confirmed in the case of Crimea
since the event occurred in 2014 and we are able to see a few years of post annexation
data. In this case, we have confirmed that as GDPPC rises above previous
performance, the annexed region successfully integrates into the larger society. As
investment rises above previous performance, the annexed region successfully
integrates into the larger society. As property values rise, the annexed region
successfully integrates into the larger region. In the cases of Kashmir and Hong Kong,
we tentatively expect to see similar results, but will need to wait a minimum of two years
to see the results of the post- annexation period of 2020 and onward.
This research has also introduced interesting implications for investors in the real
estate market in Crimea. This study points to the fact that there is a hidden opportunity
in this annexed region. We see that the first few years immediately following a
successful annexation, many investors are afraid to purchase real estate. This may
briefly allow for a dip in the market, where we might suggest this is a great time to
invest, despite what others may be thinking. We see that in the case of Crimea, this
drop was short lived and as investors saw that the annexation was in fact successful,
prices rose to well above what they were before Crimea was controlled by Russia.
Being successfully absorbed by a larger country, can result in a better economy.
However, our political analysis shows us that this is rise in property rights is largely
related to the satisfaction level of those who inhabit the contested region. In the case of
Crimea, we see people happy and satisfied, they wanted to be incorporated into Russia
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and the opposition of the international community had little impact on the success of this
annexation. The financial indicators confirm this satisfaction. We do not see that same
level of satisfaction in Kashmir or Hong Kong. We would expect to see Kashmir as a
moderate success in terms of annexation, and the financial results will probably not be
as drastic as the case of Crimea, but we would still expect recovery. In Hong Kong, we
simply to not have that level of confidence. Only the future will tell how this annexation
will turn out. We do expect to see continued political opposition on the part of the Hong
Koners, which will in turn negatively impact their financial situation. As this analysis
points out, the potential for violence in this region is also present. The economy has
been taking substantial hits, which are also reflected in the opposition to the annexation
within the region.
This study raises the question of whether integration is economically worth the
financial burden to the more dominant power, but it is outside of the scope of this initial
research. In future studies, I will look whether annexation has a positive effect on
economic and business activity in the smaller contested region, and whether it creates a
short term financial burden on the more dominant power.
An obvious limitation of this study is inherent in the fact that it is current. In all
three cases, the future will provide us with an opportunity to collect data for coming
years. As the years pass, and the accumulation of data occurs, we will have enough
data points to run more sophisticated statistical studies. This will allow us to further
develop the theory that has been put forth in this initial study. Our research has set the
groundwork for future innovation. We hope that scholars begin to look at annexation in a
more holistic and cross-disciplinary manner after reading this study.
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Appendix

A Brief History of Each Case Study
The following case studies provide context for each of the contested regions
analyzed in this paper. Although the aim of this research is not to examine the reasons
for annexation but rather the consequences of, it is still important to understand the
background on each conflict we examine.

Crimea
Located in east Europe, Crimea is a small region nestled between the Black Sea,
Ukraine and Russia. This territory has gained much international publicity in its
annexation by Russia, and it is often thought of in two parts. The first being the Republic
of Crimea and the other being the federal city of Sevastopol. Both parts of the territory
were incorporated into Russia as the 84th and 85th Federal Subjects of the Russian
Federation. 30 Despite internal sentiments of the people of Crimea, the UN as well as the
West has been rather vocal on their dissatisfaction with Russia’s aggressive maneuvers
to reclaim Crimea from Ukraine’s control. 31

30
Putin signs laws on reunification of Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia. (n.d.). Retrieved
November 10, 2019, from https://tass.com/russia/724785
31
United Nations. (2014, April 1). General Assembly. Retrieved from
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_res_68_262.pdf
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Crimea was initially annexed by the Russian Empire as a consequence of the
Russo-Turkish War in 1783. 32 However, after the Russian revolution Crimea was an
independent state in 1917. WWII had devastating effects on the Tatars in Crimea, as
many of these native Crimeans were sent out of the country to central Asia. This mass
deportation is now actually recognized as an act of genocide. 33 During 1954, Crimea
came under the control of Ukrainian SSR but when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991,
Crimea was once again to experience independence. Shortly after the collapse, in 1997,
the Partition Treaty allowed Russia to continue basing their fleet in Crimea and this
foreshadowed the future Russia held in this region. 34 After the Ukrainian Revolution in
2014, Russia seized the opportunity to regain control of Crimea. 35 Russia was criticized
by the United Nations and the United States for this violent acquisition of Crimea. 36
Despite international criticism, Russia holds to the fact that a referendum was held
regarding the reunification with Russia and the results stated the majority of Crimeans
were in favor of joining Russia again. The United Nations refuses to recognize this vote,
and many have said that the referendum was not legal. Regardless of outside opinion,
Crimea was fully integrated with Russia in March 2014. 37

32
M. S. Anderson (December 1958). "The Great Powers and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea,
1783–4". The Slavonic and East European Review. 37 (88): 17–41.
33
Thomas, P. F. (1993). Geopedagogy as battleground: The contribution of textbook sanitisation to the
russification and cultural genocide of Ukraine. International Research in Geographical and Environmental
Education, 2(2), 24-51. doi:10.1080/10382046.1993.9964909
34
Michel, C. (2015, March 05). The Crime of the Century. Retrieved November 10, 2019, from
https://newrepublic.com/article/121222/one-year-after-russias-annexation-world-has-forgotten-crimea
35
Putin signs laws on reunification of Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia. (n.d.). Retrieved
November 10, 2019, from https://tass.com/russia/724785
36
United Nations. (2014, April 1). General Assembly. Retrieved from
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_res_68_262.pdf
37
Putin signs laws on reunification of Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia. (n.d.). Retrieved
November 10, 2019, from https://tass.com/russia/724785
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Since this absorption into Russia, public opinion in both states has been strongly
in favor of the Russian government. Elections are held for Crimea and Russia
continuously wins the majority of the seats in parliament. 38 There has been a small
movement amongst the Tatars to abstain from these elections, but this voice seems to
be in the minority and the movement has not gained much traction. 39

Kashmir
Kashmir has been the cornerstone of conflict in the east, since the end of British
rule in 1947. With the formation of Pakistan and India, the two states have not seen eye
to eye on who would control this region nestled between the Himalayas and the Pir
Panjal Range. 40 Despite attempts at multilateral diplomacy and democratic ideology, the
people of Kashmir have yet to formally cast a vote on their preferred alignment. 41
Meanwhile, brutality and human rights violations continue in the region. 42 India currently
controls Kashmir, and their latest announcement of dominance in the region was met by
a devastating terrorist act in 2019. 43 The international community continues to watch as

Crimea declares independence, seeks UN recognition. (n.d.). Retrieved November 10, 2019, from
https://www.rt.com/news/crimea-referendum-results-official-250/
39
Zimin, D. (2019). Voting behaviour of Crimean Tatars 2012-2018: For or against Russia? Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies, 19(2), 293-313. doi:10.1080/14683857.2019.1617944
40
Snow, S. (2016, September 20). Analysis: Why Kashmir Matters. Retrieved March/April, 2020, from
https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/analysis-why-kashmir-matters/
41
Welle, D. (2019, April 30). India elections: Why are Kashmiris not voting?: DW: 30.04.2019. Retrieved
March, 2020, from https://www.dw.com/en/india-elections-why-are-kashmiris-not-voting/a-48547313
42
Kazi, S. (2014). RAPE, IMPUNITY AND JUSTICE IN KASHMIR. Retrieved from Socio-Legal Review
43
Kashmir attack: Tracing the path that led to Pulwama. (2019, April 30). Retrieved May 5, 2020, from
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47302467
38
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these two nuclear equipped countries continue to struggle to reach an agreed upon
solution.
The Kashmir Valley is a largely Muslim territory, which has led to their reluctance
to wanting to join the Hindu led India. With a population of approximately 4 million
people, 95% are Muslim where only 4% are Hindu. 44 With such a majority of the territory
practicing the Muslim faith, Pakistan has made the argument that Kashmiris are better
aligned to their state, although many have speculated that joining Pakistan may actually
weaken their standing in the international system. 45 Understanding the positions of each
opposing state, one can see that solving this territorial dispute is not an easy one. The
UN has had several failed attempts at trying to put this issue to an official vote and the
people of Kashmir have not had the ability to formally voice their majority opinion. 46
While the voice of Kashmir remains largely unheard, India claims that Pakistan has
supported rebels and terrorism in the territory. They claim that Pakistan is spreading
anti-India propaganda in the region and has attempted to stir rebellion in Kashmir
multiple times. 47 While Pakistan claims that India is themselves committing human right
violations, despite the fact that they have not been formally acknowledged or
investigated. 48 To complicate matters further, China also controls the Aksai Chin region,

BBC NEWS. Retrieved May 7, 2020, from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/
45
Abi-habib, M., Mughal, J.; Masood, S. (2019, September 19). In Pakistan-Held Kashmir, Growing Calls
for Independence. Retrieved May 7, 2020, from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/world/asia/pakistankashmir-independence.html
46
Sumathi Subbiah, Security Council Mediation and the Kashmir Dispute: Reflections on Its Failures and
Possibilities for Renewal, 27 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 173 (2004),
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol27/iss1/8
47
Conflict Between India and Pakistan | Global Conflict Tracker. (2020, November 12). Retrieved
November 12, 2020, from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-andpakistan
48
Kazi, S. (2014). RAPE, IMPUNITY AND JUSTICE IN KASHMIR. Retrieved from Socio-Legal Review
44

73

and claims that this is not a part of the Kashmir territory since their victory over India in
1962. 49
The Kashmir Valley has been the battleground where Pakistan, India and China
have waged war for the majority of the 20th century and it continues today. The IndoPakistan War of 1947 marked the first official war of the territory and led to failed UN
meditation on the issue. 50 The UN established a commission to address the issue,
called the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), and this council
passed Resolution 47 in 1948 where they called for a cease-fire. 51 The UNCIP asked
for Pakistan and India to stop the use of military force in the region and hold a plebiscite
where the accession of the state to India or Pakistan could be formally voted on. Both
states failed to heed the direction of the council and a pattern of disagreement was
established. This was followed by a failed attempt at demilitarization set forth by the
Dixon plan and a military standoff in 1950. 52 India and Pakistan continued to accuse the
other of ill-intended motives and India backed out of holding a plebiscite. Violence was
again heightened in 1962, but this time it was between China and India in the SinoIndian war over Aksai Chin. China won this war and continues to control the territory
today. 53 Shortly after the Chinese victory, Operation Gibraltar was launched in 1965 and
Pakistan attempted to lead a covert operation to enlist Kashmirs to unite in a rebellion
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against the Indian government using guerilla warfare techniques that they had seen
used by the United States. However, this operation failed to mobilize a Kashmir
resistance movement and many of those involved in the operation were actually turned
into the Indian government by Kashmiris. 54 In 1971, the Indio-Pakistani War led to a
victory for India and a resulting recognition of Bangladesh as an independent state. 55
This weakened the Pakistani position further and they ultimately surrendered. A summit
was conducted in Simla, where the Simla Agreement was signed by both sides. During
this summit, India advocated for peace and the two states agreed on settling their
disagreements with the use of bilateral diplomacy and to honor the agreed upon Line of
Control. The two states agreed to meet again to establish a final solution on the issue,
but the meeting was never held and both sides proved to have a different understanding
of the role the UN would play in the future. 56
While surrounding states were taking up arms to decide the fate of Kashmir, an
internal rise of Kashmiri nationalism was developing. Jayaprakash Narayan's letter to
Nehru on May 1, 1956 clearly illustrates the sentiment of the Kashmiri people, “From all
the information I have, 95 per cent of Kashmir Muslims do not wish to be or remain
Indian citizens. I doubt therefore the wisdom of trying to keep people by force where
they do not wish to stay. This cannot but have serious long-term political consequences,
though immediately it may suit policy and please public opinion.” 57 As their voice
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continued to be ignored, the revival of the National Conference began in 1975 and
continued until 1983, when the separatist and Islamism developed in 1984. 58 In the late
1980s, state elections occurred in Kashmir but to the disappointment of many
onlookers, these elections were said to have been rigged by the Indian government. In
1999, the conflict in Kargil between Pakistan and India left the international community
scared that a nuclear outbreak would occur and President Clinton asked Pakistan to
withdraw to end the conflict. A letter from Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden
addressed the American people on the US support of India on the Kashmir conflict and
cited this as one of the reasons he was fighting the US. 59 Adding this terrorist undertone
to a potential nuclear war, helped this Kashmir conflict to gain international attention in
the 2000s.
In February 2019, a devastating terrorist act resulted in a suicide bomber from a
Pakistani Islamic militant group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, killing over 40 Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF) members. 60 This resulted in the US voicing a public condemnation
of the act and their assistance to India on counterterrorism efforts. A few months after
this attack, Amit Shah announced that India was lifting the somewhat autonomous
status that Kashmir previously had. This was followed by an internet blackout imposed
on Kashmir by India, and it was only recently lifted in February 2020. 61 This block on
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communication has made it difficult for Kashmiris to communicate with the international
community, and has again silenced their voice. As Kashmir continues to be controlled
by India, Pakistan has continuously sought international support in resolving the issue.
Recently, Pakistan reached out to President Trump to appeal for US assistance on the
issue. 62

Hong Kong
Hong Kong has been a sought after territory for many states attempting to
increase their influence in the East. From 1842, to the better majority of the 20th
century, Hong Kong bounced between China, the United Kingdom and was even
occupied by the Japanese for a short stent. 63 In 1997 the Sino-British Joint Declaration
called for Hong Kong to be officially transitioned from the United Kingdom to China, but
it called for certain stipulations that were agreed upon by both sides. The declaration
made Hong Kong an independent administrative unit of China, ruled by Hong Kong’s
Basic Law. This semi-autonomous status was agreed upon by both China and the
United Kingdom. Shortly after the hand-over was complete, conflict began. A movement
of advocating for democracy began to emerge in Hong Kong and created an antiChinese sentiment. For many years, China took a hands off approach and allowed
Hong Kong to function in a semi-autonomous manner, but this has changed. Attempts
to incorporate Hong Kong into mainland China have been met with much opposition.
62
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Recent protests in Hong Kong have drawn the attention of the international community,
as tension in the region grows. 64 China’s position is that Hong Kong will eventually be
integrated into mainland China, despite the sentiments of Hong Kong nationalists.
After the transition from British to Chinese leadership, Hong Kong and China
have implemented a policy coined the “one country, two systems” approach. Opinions
on this approach vary among the residents of Hong Kong. Those who support
integration with China favor the one country aspect of this approach, and feel that
aligning themselves with mainland China will bring stability to the region. It is no
surprise that those who sit on the other side of the argument favor the two systems
aspect of this approach, and want the sovereignty of the Hong Kong administrative unit
to remain autonomous. Many of these supporters are advocating for a transition to more
democratic policies and freedom for the people of Hong Kong. 65
For many years China ruled Hong Kong, but the Quing Dynasty of 1842 shifted
this. The United Kingdom began their reign of the region shortly after, and the Treaty of
Nanking sealed this change in power. For a brief period between 1941 and 1945, Hong
Kong was occupied by the Japanese. In 1972, China requested that the United Nations
take Hong Kong off of their list of non-self-governing states. This signaled a change in
the autonomous status that Hong Kong had been accustomed to. By 1997, China
officially regained control over Hong Kong but the British agreed to this under the

64
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stipulations agreed upon in the Sino-British Joint Declaration. 66 Many of the residents of
Hong Kong were optimistic when the power shifted to China, because there were some
promises that were initially made. China had agreed to keep Hong Kong’s independent
economic, legal and political system, with the aim of eventually achieving a democratic
government. 67
China allowed the island their autonomy during the initial transition; however this
eventually began to change. Their hands off approach shifted over time, and attempts at
a more democratic government were shot down. As the first decade of the 2000’s came
to an end, tension between Hong Kong and China intensified. Hong Kong nationalism
grew, as China attempted to gain influence over the territory. Travel between mainland
China and Hong Kong was made easier as the Individual Visit Scheme was introduced
and the Guangzhou-Shenzhen high speed train was built, to allow travelers to easily
commute from Beijing to Hong Kong. The Chinese government produced a report in
2014, which stated that Hong Kong should no longer have an independent judiciary
system and they should be fully integrated with the Chinese system. This stance made
it clear that China had little interest in upholding the promises made in the Sino-British
Joint Declaration, and they would not support Hong Kong’s desire to move to a
democratic system. Hong Kong nationalists were incited, and a heightened desire for
independence grew among local groups. Many Hong Kongers began to feel their
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identity was being taken from them, as their economic and political freedom began to be
questioned.
With the Umbrella Revolution erupting in 2014, Hong Kongers began to express
their concern through protests. 68 By this point, it was clear to the international
community that China had every intention of dissolving their boundaries that stood
between them and Hong Kong. The Chinese police forces in Hong Kong have not
responded well to the protests of young nationalist groups, and in 2019-2020 the clash
of these two caught global attention. 69 The widespread sentiment among Hong Kong
protestors is that the Chinese government is eroding their legal system and forcing them
into conformity with the rule of law in mainland China. This view was exaggerated with
the Fugitive Offenders Bill in 2019, which led many people to fear that China would use
this bill to ultimate any political opposition. 70 Protesters in Hong Kong have gathered in
masses, and observers have indicated that approximately two million people have been
involved in the marches. These protests have only slowed down due to the spread of
the Coronavirus in January and February of 2020. 71 The civil unrest in Hong Kong has
led to instability in the economic and business landscape in Hong Kong. 72 The economy
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was pushed into a recession in 2019 and the stock market has been declining. 73 The
Chinese government has attempted to censor the media in mainland China from much
of the protests in Hong Kong, and for a while they were ignoring much of the riots.
Recent voices from China indicate that their characterization of the events in Hong
Kong have been colored by a condemnation of the protestors and a sentiment that the
West may be spreading misinformation through media channels. 74
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Financial Analysis Data Sources
The below tables show the data that is examined in this study:
Gross Domestic Product per Capital (GDPPC)
Region

Measure

Definition

Date

Source
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Directorate of
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Statistics of the
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of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of
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Property Values
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Figures Comparing the Percent Changes:
Crimea

Land Rates. (n.d.). Retrieved July 21, 2020, from https://srinagar.nic.in/document-category/land_rates/
REM Navigator- Analytics. Reviews of prices and real estate market of Crimea. Retrieved from
http://www.remnavigator.com/overview.html
85
Federal State Statistic Service. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://gks.ru/storage/mediabank/Region_Pokaz_2019.pdf
86
Property Market Statistics - Private Domestic - Average House Prices. Retrieved from
https://data.gov.hk/en-data/dataset/hk-rvd-tsinfo_rvd-property-market-statistics/resource/49171311-4aff4026-871a-82b1319f6ff8
83
84

88

Crimea GRPPC (constant 2018), % change from previous year vs % change
from 2014

250.00

In 2018, there was a 203.5%
change from the annexation
in 2014, whereas the percent
change from the previous

200.00
150.00
100.00
50.00
0.00

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

% Change from Previous Year

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

% Change from 2014

Figure 1. Crimea GRPPC (constant 2018), % change from previous year vs % change
from 2014
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Figure 2. Crimea, Real Fixed Capital Investment (RUB mil), % change from previous
year vs % change from 2014
Crimea, Real House Prices on the Secondary Market (RUB), % change from
previous year vs % change from 2014
In 2018 there was a 161.76%
change from 2014, compared to
the percentage change from
previous year(s) at -56.83-98.79
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Figure 3. Crimea, Real House Prices on the Secondary Market (RUB), % change from
previous year vs % change from 2014

Kashmir

90

Kashmir, Gross Regional Product per Capita (constant 2012), %
change from previous year
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2019 marks the point
of Kashmir annexation
by India, there was an
increase of 4.41% in
GRPPC in 2019
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Figure 4. Kashmir, GRPPC (constant 2012), % change from previous year
Kashmir, FDI, % change from previous year
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Figure 5. Kashmir, FDI, % change from the previous year
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In 2018, FDI
dropped to 0. Then
in 2019
(annexation), it
raised to 41 (Rs. In
Lahk, constant 2019
price)

Kashmir, Avg. Real Value of Residential Plot per Kanal, % change from
previous year vs 2019
Government projections for 2021,
expect that land value will increase
156.95% from what it was in 2019 at
the point of annexation by India
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Figure 6. Kashmir, Avg. Real Value of Residential Plot per Kanal, % change from
previous year vs 2019
Hong Kong
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Hong Kong, GDPPC % Change from Previous Year
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In 2019, HK’s GDPPC decreased
by -1.93%, the last time we saw
negative change was 2009.
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Figure 7. Hong Kong, GDPPC % change from the previous year

Hong Kong, Gross capital formation (% of GDP)% Change from
Previous Year

In 2019, the percentage
change in Investment was 14%, the lowest it has ever
been
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Figure 8. Hong Kong, Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) % change from the previous
year

Hong Kong, Real House Prices, % Change from Previous Year
In 2019, the HK real estate
market experienced house
prices that had a -0.89% change
from the previous year
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Figure 9. Hong Kong, Real House Prices, % Change from the Previous Year

Figures on Rate of Change from the time of Annexation
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Crimea, GRPPC ROC from 2014 (constant 2018)
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Figure 10. Crimea, GRPPC ROC from 2014 (constant 2018)

Crimea, Real Fixed Capital Investment ROC from 2014 (RUB mil)
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Figure 11. Crimea, Real Fixed Capital Investment ROC from 2014 (RUB mil)
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Crimea, Real House Prices on the Secondary Market ROC from 2014
(RUB)
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Figure 12. Crimea, Real House Prices on the Secondary Market ROC from 2014 (RUB)

Kashmir

96

Kashmir, Gross Regional Product per Capita ROC from 2019
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Figure 13. Kashmir, Gross Regional Product per Capita ROC from 2019

Kashmir, FDI ROC from 2019
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Figure 14. Kashmir, FDI ROC from 2019
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Kashmir, Avg. Real Value of Residential Plot per Kanal ROC from
2019
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Figure 15. Kashmir, Avg. Real Value of Residential Plot per Kanal ROC from 2019

Hong Kong
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2021

Hong Kong, GDPPC ROC from 2019
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Figure 16. Hong Kong, GDPPC ROC from 2019

Hong Kong, Gross capital formation (% of GDP) ROC from 2019
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Figure 17. Hong Kong, Gross capital formation (% of GDP) ROC from 2019

Hong Kong, Real House Price ROC from 2019
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Figure 18. Hong Kong, Real House Price ROC from 2019

Data used for Financial Analysis
This section provides the data used to generate the financial analysis. The footnotes
explain all of the sources and calculations for how these data sets were produced.
Crimea

100

GRPPC
Per capita gross
regional product
(Ruble) 88

GDP Deflator
(2018) 89

GRPPC (constant
2018) 90

16,882.48

1.16

14,553.86

21,171.05

1.16

18,250.91

27,633.96

1.16

23,822.38

36,320.86

1.16

31,311.09

36,412.33

1.16

31,389.94

43,139.19

1.16

37,188.96

50,874.81

1.16

43,857.59

59,258.56

1.16

51,084.97

61,662.87

1.16

53,157.65

2014

100,526.4

1.16

86,660.69

2015

139,873.3

1.16

120,580.43

2016

171,623.8

1.16

147,951.55

2017

180,925.0

1.16

155,969.83

2018

204,571.4

1.16

176,354.66

Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Per capita gross
regional product
(UAH) 87
6460
8101
10574
13898
13933
16507
19467
22675
23595

State Statistics Service of Ukraine documents publishing. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://ukrstat.org/en/operativ/menu/menu_e/m_galuz_e/region_e.htm for 2005-2013
88
Federal State Statistic Service. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.gks.ru/accounts for 2014-2018, the
2005-2013 data is from UKRSTAT (26), and it has been translated into Ruble in this column
89
GDP deflator. (n.d.). Retrieved May 26, 2020, from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?end=2018
90
After the Ukrainian data from 2005-2013 was translated in RUB (in column entitled: Per capita gross
regional product (Ruble), the GDP deflator was used to control for inflation, and this column gives us
GRPPC at constant 2018 prices all in Ruble for 2005-2018
87

101

Investment

Year

Nominal Amount of
fixed capital
investment in Ruble
in mil 91

2006

3,643.23

2007

8,740.29

2008

CPI of each
year 92

CPI of
2018 93

Real Amount of fixed
capital investment in
Ruble in mil 94

9.668654548

2.8782972

12238.17126

9.007298689

2.8782972

27351.74127

12,131.31

14.11076778

2.8782972

59473.37275

2009

18,147.87

11.64732958

2.8782972

73437.25032

2010

22417.486

2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

14339.017
17562.531
42104.335
42,964.81
77,083.07
121,053.79
317,907.10
480,499.52

6.849392303
8.440464859
5.074743008
6.753710262
7.823411839
15.53440505
7.04244763
3.683329444
2.878297236

2.8782972
2.8782972
2.8782972
2.8782972
2.8782972
2.8782972
2.8782972
2.8782972
2.8782972

53346.17777
42048.461
30964.60305
98794.68867
116781.3398
416023.6044
296187.2563
406822.6729
480499.52

State Statistics Service of Ukraine documents publishing. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://ukrstat.org/en/operativ/operativ2013/ibd/iki_reg/iki_reg_e/arh_ikreg for 2006-2013; Federal State
Statistic Service. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.gks.ru/accounts for 2014-2018, the Ukraine data for
2006-2013 was translated into Ruble
92
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) - Russian Federation. (n.d.). Retrieved May 26, 2020, from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=RU
93
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) - Russian Federation. (n.d.). Retrieved May 26, 2020, from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=RU
94
This column was calculated by first getting all the data into the same currency: Ruble, then using CPI to
control for inflation at constant 2018 prices
91

102

Real Estate Market

Year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Nominal House
Price on the
Secondary
Market (in RUB
in the last
recorded month
of the year) 95
75570
72135
79005
85875
82440
79005
96180
82440
52,385
54,465
57,240

CPI of each
year 96
14.11076778
11.64732958
6.849392303
8.440464859
5.074743008
6.753710262
7.823411839
15.53440505
7.04244763
3.683329444
2.878297236

CPI of
2018 97
2.878297236
2.878297236
2.878297236
2.878297236
2.878297236
2.878297236
2.878297236
2.878297236
2.878297236
2.878297236
2.878297236

Real House Price on the
Secondary Market (in RUB in the
last recorded month of the
year) 98
15414.67661
17826.05788
33200.00711
29284.37939
46758.39226
33670.36256
35385.40907
15274.92191
21410.11317
42561.07453
57240

Kashmir

REM Navigator- Analytics. Reviews of prices and real estate market of Crimea. Retrieved from
http://www.remnavigator.com/overview.html for 2008-2013; Federal State Statistic Service. (n.d.).
Retrieved from https://gks.ru/storage/mediabank/Region_Pokaz_2019.pdf for 2014-2018; all data was
translated into Ruble.
96
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) - Russian Federation. (n.d.). Retrieved May 26, 2020, from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=RU
97
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) - Russian Federation. (n.d.). Retrieved May 26, 2020, from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=RU
98
This column was calculated by first getting all the data into the same currency: Ruble, then using CPI to
control for inflation at constant 2018 prices
95

103

GRPPC
Year
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

GRPPC (constant at 2012 prices) 99
61852.31432
62877.83006
65267.61475
62219.2861
72168.24662
73816.49874
76877.14229
80264.98056

Investment

Year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Nominal FDI
(Rs. in Lakh) 100
2500
1100
200
200
0
41

CPI of each
year 101
5.86
6.32
2.23
4
5.24
9.63

CPI of
2019 102
9.63
9.63
9.63
9.63
9.63
9.63

FDI (Rs. in Lakh, constant
2019 prices) 103
4108.361775
1676.107595
863.67713
481.5
0
41

Gross State Value Added by economic activity at current prices. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://data.gov.in/
100
Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade: MoCI: GoI. (n.d.). Retrieved September 06,
2020, from https://dipp.gov.in/publications/fdi-statistics
101
Historic inflation India - CPI inflation. Retrieved July 11, 2020, from https://www.inflation.eu/en/inflationrates/india/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-india.aspx
102
Historic inflation India - CPI inflation. Retrieved July 11, 2020, from https://www.inflation.eu/en/inflationrates/india/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-india.aspx
103
This column represents real prices at 2019 constant, which is controlled for inflation. This data was
generated using the nominal values and CPI.
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104

Real Estate Market

Year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

Avg. Nominal Value
of Residential Plot per
Kanal (Rs in Lacs) 104
18.96
24.89
30.14
30.4
40.24
41.38
44.32
46.05

CPI of each
year 105
5.86
6.32
2.23
4
5.24
9.63
6.69
6.828

CPI of
2019 106
9.63
9.63
9.63
9.63
9.63
9.63
9.63
9.63

Avg. Real Value of
Residential Plot per
Kanal (Rs in
Lacs) 107
31.1578157
37.92574367
130.1561435
73.188
73.95251908
41.38
63.79695067
64.94749561

Land Rates. (n.d.). Retrieved July 21, 2020, from https://srinagar.nic.in/document-category/land_rates/
Historic inflation India - CPI inflation. Retrieved July 11, 2020, from https://www.inflation.eu/en/inflationrates/india/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-india.aspx; for 2020: GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF
STATISTICS AND PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION NATIONAL STATISTICAL OFFICE. (n.d.).
Retrieved from
http://mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/press_release/CPI%20Press%20Release%20August%202020.pdf;
for 2021 projection: used the .138 average increase from 2014-2020 to project the rate in 2021
106
Historic inflation India - CPI inflation. Retrieved July 11, 2020, from https://www.inflation.eu/en/inflationrates/india/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-india.aspx
107
This column represents real prices at 2019 constant, which is controlled for inflation. This data was
generated using the nominal values and CPI.
104
105

105

Hong Kong
GDPPC
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

GDP per capita (constant LCU) 108
32067.48524
35130.09803
39292.2915
41662.95726
46524.63937
46942.06452
46504.51273
47074.18413
51583.89192
54979.79288
57730.94702
62644.77641
68380.56394
67853.25963
66906.26681
76750.99602
84521.45647
89860.73915
94913.88928
101754.4587
108597.4457
110078.6399
114898.8793
125122.7329
124722.8841
136797.4152
153572.2606
165248.9516
167269.8815
173120.1683
181480.1808
191183.3463
199580.9185
206915.0346

GDP per capita (constant LCU) - Hong Kong SAR, China. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KN?locations=HK&view=chart
108

106

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

107

207673.5271
207117.0849
215874.7477
201486.4679
204573.8288
218318.0795
217930.5363
220561.9727
227752.1246
245643.3994
262641.9304
279312.829
294824.2557
299302.0782
291313.9628
308753.1676
321449.4598
323325.8276
332016.6042
338800.1937
343949.9129
349242.0195
359779.753
367129.7812
360041.9586

Investment

Year

109

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Gross capital formation (%
of GDP) 109
CPI of each year 110 CPI of 2019 111
24.97950925
99.54617589
134.5930529
27.58240928
95.87739791
134.5930529
25.49120382
94.28759412
134.5930529
23.18095242
91.47486433
134.5930529
22.37964014
89.02901235
134.5930529
22.35743374
88.78442715
134.5930529
21.05982119
89.51818274
134.5930529
22.28514831
91.32117755
134.5930529
21.3960755
93.17510441
134.5930529
21.04121437
97.17836406
134.5930529
21.84686409
97.73861669
134.5930529
23.89046642
100
134.5930529
24.1431843
105.2765611
134.5930529
25.22013354
109.5548538
134.5930529
24.03038856
114.2915351
134.5930529
23.82246942
119.3643679
134.5930529
21.54147973
122.9397983
134.5930529
21.50878681
125.904044
134.5930529
22.07090063
127.7681573
134.5930529
21.99739624
130.8444535
134.5930529
18.91107608
134.5930529
134.5930529

Gross Capital Formation - Hong Kong SAR, China. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org

Consumer price index (2010 = 100) - Hong Kong SAR, China. (n.d.). Retrieved August 1, 2020, from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?locations=HK
111
Consumer price index (2010 = 100) - Hong Kong SAR, China. (n.d.). Retrieved August 1, 2020, from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?locations=HK
110

108

Real Estate Market

Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Nominal House Prices
(Hong Kong) 112
132963
121920
109710
124478
120041
169879
183927
164077
239540
234851
294149
301514
410697
496519
522310
447041
560318
469391
527179
495012
504665

CPI of each
year 113
99.54617589
95.87739791
94.28759412
91.47486433
89.02901235
88.78442715
89.51818274
91.32117755
93.17510441
97.17836406
97.73861669
100
105.2765611
109.5548538
114.2915351
119.3643679
122.9397983
125.904044
127.7681573
130.8444535
134.5930529

CPI of
Real House Price
114
2019
(constant 2019) 115
134.5930529
179774.8224
134.5930529
171151.7559
134.5930529
156608.1303
134.5930529
183152.7618
134.5930529
181476.6247
134.5930529
257528.6451
134.5930529
276539.3094
134.5930529
241823.6922
134.5930529
346019.6808
134.5930529
325271.0968
134.5930529
405064.1727
134.5930529
405816.8974
134.5930529
525064.2923
134.5930529
609995.8668
134.5930529
615087.525
134.5930529
504075.1607
134.5930529
613429.591
134.5930529
501785.0553
134.5930529
555338.9243
134.5930529
509193.7373
134.5930529
504665

Property Market Statistics - Private Domestic - Average House Prices. Retrieved from
https://data.gov.hk/en-data/dataset/hk-rvd-tsinfo_rvd-property-market-statistics/resource/49171311-4aff4026-871a-82b1319f6ff8
113
Consumer price index (2010 = 100) - Hong Kong SAR, China. (n.d.). Retrieved August 1, 2020, from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?locations=HK
114
Consumer price index (2010 = 100) - Hong Kong SAR, China. (n.d.). Retrieved August 1, 2020, from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?locations=HK
115
This column was calculated using the current prices and CPI to control for inflation
112
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